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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE "ABORTED" EVOLUTION OF FE­
TAL RIGHTS AFTER Roe v. Wade-Doug/as v. Town ofHariford, 542 
F. Supp. 1267 (D. Conn. 1982). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 22, 1973, the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade 1 held 
that" 'person' [within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment] 
... does not include the unbom";2 almost a decade later, on July 2, 
1982, T. Emmet Clarie, a Connecticut Federal District Court Judge, 
in denying a motion to dismiss, held in Doug/as v. Town ofHariford3 
that a "viable fetus is a 'person' within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983".4 Are these two decisions consistent or do they reflect a di­
rect conflict? This note suggests that there is a direct conflict which 
cannot be resolved simply by distinguishing a case based on the 
fourteenth amendment from one based on section 1983; an examina­
tion of the legal history and purpose of section 1983 makes this point 
clear.s 
Given that the cases are in direct conflict, is there some analysis 
of Judge Clarie's decision that might provide a rationale for his ap­
parent flouting of the Supreme Court's holding in Roe?6 In the 
Doug/as opinion, the judge reasoned that since fetal protection had 
been extended in a numb~r of recent cases,7 it should not be denied 
in this one.8 In this note his rationale is strengthened by an exami­
nation of I) the evolution of fetal rights both before and after the 
Roe decision9 and 2) the problems and potential conflicts created by 
that decision. lO 
This examination makes it clear that the Roe decision has inter­
fered with the evolution of fetal rights and has made it extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to provide protection to the potentially 
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
2. Id. at 158. 
3. 542 F. Supp. 1267 (D. Conn. 1982). 
4. Id. at 1269. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981). 
5. See infra notes 139-48 and accompanying text. 
6. See infra notes 150-53 and accompanying text. 
7. 542 F. Supp. at 1270. 
8. Id. 
9. See infra notes 17-56 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 57-110 and accompanying text. 
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viable fetus. I I Lawmakers at both the federal and state levels have 
responded with "solutions"12 that are untenable at this point in our 
history when the concerns expressed by the Roe Court l3 are still 
valid. This note examines those "solutions" and their conse­
quencesl4 and suggests that Judge Clarie's decision may offer a more 
acceptable alternative. 15 This alternative solution would extend such 
protection in a way that would allow both continued recognition of a 
woman's constitutionally protected right to an abortion as well as a 
balancing of that right against the fetus's equally protected right at 
the point of potential viability.16 
II. FETAL RIGHTS EVOLUTION 
A. Tort Law 17 
The beginning of common law tort actions involving injury to 
the fetus can be traced back to 1884 when, in Dietrich v. Northamp­
ton, IS} the cO\lrt held that there was no cause of action for prenatal 
injuries. 19 As early as 1898, however, the dissenting opinion in Af­
faire v. St. Luke's Hospita/20 argued that such an action should be 
allowed -when the fetus is viable.21 The first real turning point came 
in 1946 when the court in Bonbrest v. Kotz 22 extended protection to a 
viable fetus which was born alive;23 today such protection is avail­
able in essentially all jurisdictions.24 The viability distinction was 
abandoned soon thereafter25 and today is not a requirement in most 
11. ld. 
12. See infra text accompanying notes 105-20. 
13. 410 U.S. at 153. 
14. See infra notes 113-28 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 129-68 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 154-60 and accompanying text. 
17. The evolution of tort law in this area has been thoroughly traced both before 
and after Roe in a number of law reviews. See, e.g. , Kader, The Law ofTortious Prenatal 
Death Since Roe v. Wade, 45 Mo. L. REv. 639 (1980); King, The Juridical Status of the 
Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection of the Unhorn, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1647 (1979); 
Murphy, The Evolution ofThe Prenatal Duty Rule: Analysis hy Inherent Determinants, 7 
U. DAY. L. REV. 351 (1982). 
18. 138 Mass. 14 (1884). 
19. Id. at 17. 
20. 76 Ill. App. 441 (1898), affdper curiam, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900). 
21. ld. at 454 (Windes, J., dissenting). 
22. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946). 
23. Id. at 141-42. 
24. See Kader, supra note 17, at 642. For a list of cases that have followed Bon­
brest, see M. Shaw & C. Damme, Legal Status ofthe Fetus, GENETICS AND THE LAW 14 
n. 14 (A. Milunsky & G.J. Annas eds. 1976). 
25. Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipeline, 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956). 
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jurisdictions.26 
Pre-Roe tort actions involving the interpretation of statutes 
showed an evolutionary process similar to that in the common law 
area. Three years after Bonbrest was decided, one state court de­
clared that a viable fetus, born alive, was a "person" within its con­
stitution.27 A decade later, a court in the same state held that there 
was a cause of action for wrongful death if a viable fetus was injured 
and then stillbom.28 It was in this case that the well-known twin 
hypothetical originated.29 The evolutionary process was continued 
in 1967 when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a 
nonviable fetus who had been injured and then had lived two and 
one-half hours after birth was a "person" within the state's wrongful 
death act. 30 
After the Roe decision, the opinions in the civil statutory law 
area can generally be grouped in three main classes, with a number 
of strong dissents in each. In the first group, the courts have essen­
tially ignored the Roe holding and have continued to extend protec­
tion to the fetus by allowing a wrongful death action whfther or not 
the fetus was viable at the time ofinjury.31 In the secop.d, the fourts 
have held that, if viable, a fetus is a "person" within the statute, al­
lowing recovery without a live birth requirement.32 Earlier, one 
court in this group had interpreted the same statute to include the 
nonviable fetus. 33 The courts in the third group have taken the Roe 
decision even further and declared that a fetus, viable or not, is not a 
26. See Kader, supra note 17, at 644. 
27. Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, 152 Ohio St. 114, 128-29, 87 N.E.2d 334, 
340 (1949). 
28. Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 433, 167 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1959). 
29. In the twin hypothetical, twin fetuses were injured shortly before birth; one 
died before, and the other immediately after, birth. The court pointed out there was no 
valid reason to allow recovery for one and not for the other. Id. at 108. 
30. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2 (West 1983-1984). Torigian v. Watertown 
News Co., 352 Mass. 446,449,225 N.E.2d 926, 927 (1967). 
31. E.g., Huskey v. Smith, 289 Ala. 52, 265 So.2d 596 (1972); Presley v. Newport 
Hosp., 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976). For examples of cases that have allowed a 
nonviable fetus to recover only if born alive, see, Wallace v. Wallace, 120 N.H. 675, 421 
A.2d 134 (1980); Scott v. Kopp, 494 Pa. 487, 431 A.2d 959 (1981). 
32. E.g., Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So.2d 354 (1974); Green v. 
Smith, 71 Ill. 2d 501, 377 N.E.2d 37 (1978); Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 
368,304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So.2d 633 (La. 1981); Mone v. Grey­
hound Lines, 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268 
Or. 258, 518 P.2d 636 (1974). This appears to be the majority position at this time. Weitl 
v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 277-78 (Iowa 1981) (Larson, J., dissenting). 
33. Compare Mone v. Greyhound Lines, 368 Mass. 354, 355, 331 N.E.2d 916, 917 
(1975) (statute includes only viable fetuses) with Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 352 
Mass. 446, 449, 225 N.E.2d 926, 927 (1967) (statute includes nonviable fetuses). 
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"person,"34 echoing that argument in Roe.35 This was also the posi­
tion taken by a federal district court in Florida when an action was 
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act36 for the stillborn death 
of a viable fetus due to a hospital's malpractice.37 
Fetal rights in common law tort actions have continued to 
evolve since Roe. Several recent cases have held that even a precon­
ception tort which results in injury to the fetus generates a cause of 
action.38 Clearly, the evolution of fetal rights was advancing toward 
greater protection before Roe,39 contrary to an argument the Court 
made in Roe,40 and has continued to do so since that decision,41 in 
spite of the problems created by it.42 
B. Criminal Law 
In the area of criminal law, there is less evidence of the evolu­
tion of fetal rights before Roe, but at least one state has defined the 
crime of murder to include the killing of a fetus.43 After Roe, the 
courts atten;tpted to interpret statutes in a manner consistent with 
that decisiou .. In two cases, when a viable fetus was injured and then 
lived a short time after birth, the crime of murder was charged.44 
When the fetus was not viable at the time of injury, however, courts 
have found it necessary to dismiss the charge of either murder45 or 
manslaughter,46 regardless of the atrocity of the crime. 
Courts have been particularly troubled when the injury oc­
34. E.g., Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 580, 565 P.2d 122, 132-33, 139 Cal. 
Rptr. 97, 107-08 (1977); Weitl v. Moes, 31\ N.W.2d 259, 273 (Iowa 1981). 
35. 410 U.S. at 158. 
36. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
37. Simon v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 759, 760-61 (S.D. Fla. 1977). 
38. Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978); Jorgensen v. Meade John­
son Laboratories, 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973); Rens10w v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill.2d 
348,367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977); Albala v. New York, 54 N.Y.2d 269, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108,429 
N.E.2d 786 (1981). 
39. See supra notes 17-30 and accompanying text. 
40. 410 U.S. at 161-62. 
41. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text. 
42. See infra notes 57-85 and accompanying text. 
43. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (Deering 1971 & Supp. 1983). 
44. People v. Greer, 79 Ill. 2d 103,402 N.E.2d 203 (1980); State v. Anderson, 135 
N.J. Super. 423, 343 A.2d 505 (1975), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 173 N.J. 
Super. 75, 413 A.2d 61\ (1980). 
45. People v. Smith, 59 Cal. App.3d 751, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1976). 
46. Commonwealth v. Edelin, 371 Mass. 497, 359 N.E.2d 4 (1976); Larkin v. 
Cahalan, 389 Mich. 533, 208 N.W.2d 176 (1973). 
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curred at approximately the time the fetus became viable.47 Some 
courts have solved this problem by simply declaring that the relevant 
statute does not apply to the unborn;48 others have declared it un­
constitutionally vague.49 With the Roe decision in the background, 
criminal law, even in areas not involving abortion, cannot evolve 
past a Bonbrest -type analysis. 50 
C. Abortion Law and The Problems Created by The Roe Decision 
In 1821 the first criminal abortion statute was adopted in Con­
necticut, making it a crime to abort a fetus after quickening.51 By 
1860, Connecticut's statute had been revised to extend protection to 
the fetus before quickening, 52 and by the late 1950's a large majority 
of states had banned abortion except to save the life of the mother.53 
At the time Roe was heard, however, the evolutionary trend in the 
abortion area was actually away from absolute fetal protection. 54 
Perhaps recognjzjng a need to balance a woman's interest in the 
birth process and the difficult problems some pregnancies presented 
for both society and the mother, the states began to m'ove'toward 
liberalization of the abortion laws in certain circumstances. 55 Yet 
the need for greater protection for the unborn had not been forgotten 
in other areas of the law. 56 
47. The time is indefinite, usually occurring between twenty-four and twenty-eight 
weeks, but may occur earlier as medical technology advances. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160-61. 
48. E.g., State v. Brown, 378 So.2d 916 (La. 1979); State v. Amaro, 448 A.2d 1257 
(R.I. 1982); State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1978). 
49. E.g., People v. Apodaca, 76 Cal. App. 3d 479, 142 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1978). 
50. An analysis that distinguishes between a viable and nonviable fetus. See supra 
note 13 and accompanying text. 
51. Roe, 410 U.S. at 138-39 n.29. Quickening is a time when life is first felt by the 
mother. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1122 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). 
52. Roe, 410 U.S. at 138-39 n.30. 
53. Id. at 139. 
54. Fourteen states had adopted ALI's Model Penal Code § 230.3 which permitted 
abortion if the child were going to be born mentally retarded or physically defective, if 
the pregnancy were a result of rape or incest, or if the mother's life were in danger. Id. at 
139-40 n.37. While Roe was pending, the court in Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224 (D. 
Conn. 1972), held that a recently passed statute only permitting abortion to save the 
mother's life was unconstitutional and, further, that a fetus was not a "person" until 
birth. Id. at 229. For an excellent discussion of this movement, see, Morgan, infra note 
63, at 1726. 
55. Roe, 410 U.S. at 139-40 n.37. 
56. The New Therapeutic Abortion Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25950­
25954 (Deering 1982), legalized abortion in California during the first twenty weeks of 
pregnancy if the mother's mental or physical health would be gravely impaired by carry­
ing the child to term. In the criminal law forum, however, the California Supreme Court 
held that a man who had maliciously killed a viable fetus could not be charged with 
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The Court in Roe struck down a Texas criminal abortion statute 
as unconstitutional based on a woman's fundamental right to pri­
vacy or autonomy, a right which allowed her to choose to end her 
pregnancy.57 The state was held to have an interest in protecting 
maternal health and the potential life of the fetus, but neither inter­
est was compelling throughout pregnancy.58 Supposedly, after Roe, 
a balancing test would be applied after the first trimester, but during 
that trimester no interference by the state would be permitted. 59 Af­
ter the first trimester, the state's compelling interest in the mother's 
health would be considered,60 but only' at the point when the fetus 
had become viable would the state's compelling interest in protecting 
it be weighed.61 The Court held that" 'person' [within the four­
teenth amendment] ... does not include the unborn."62 Criticisms 
of the majority opinion in Roe have been strong,63 and some, includ­
ing the dissent, have declared that the Court was engaged in legisla­
tion.64 Nevertheless, since Roe, the Court has tended, with the 
exception of the funding cases,65 not only to follow, but also to ex­
pand their holding.66 
In .Doe v. Bolton ,67 a companion case to Roe, a statute patterned 
after the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, and similar to 
that in one fourth of the states at the time of Roe, was substantially 
murder, Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 639, 470 P.2d 617, 630, 87 Cal. Rptr. 
481,494 (1970). In response, the legislature amended CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 to include 
the killing of a fetus in the definition of murder. PERKINS & BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW AND 
PROCEDURE 47 n.a (5th ed. 1979). 
57. 410 U.S. at 152-54. 
58. Id at 164-65. 
59. Id at 163. 
60. Id at 164-65. 
61. Id at 163-64. 
62. Id at 158. 
63. E.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE 
L.J. 920 (1973); Morgan, Roe v. Wade and'he Lesson of'he Pre-Roe Case Law, 77 MICH. 
L. REV. 1724 (1979). 
64. E.g. ,Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Ely, supra note 63, at 926; 
Morgan, supra note 63, at 1730. 
65. Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); 
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); and Beal v. Doe, 
432 U.S. 438 (1977). In all of these cases the Court held that neither the Constitution nor 
federal legislation required public funding for abortions. Zharaz, 448 u.s. a' 369; Mc­
Rae, 448 U.S. at 311;Poelker, 432 U.S. at 521; Maher, 432 U.S. at 469; Beal, 432 U.S. at 
443-48. 
66. See infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text. See also G. GUNTHER, infra 
note 69, at 610. 
67. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
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invalidated.68 Procedural restrictions, such as requiring a licensed 
hospital and approval by an abortion committee, were struck down 
as not rationally related to the patients needs.69 
The holding in Roe invalidated abortion statutes in a majority 
of the states,70 and after Roe the difficulty in drafting any sort of 
statute that would withstand constitutional attack became appar­
ent.1 1 In Colautti v. Franklin,72 the Court found the language of 
Pennsylvania's criminal abortion statute vague, even though it was 
patterned after the language of Roe;73 but, in Planned Parenthood v. 
Danforth,74 the Court also struck down a statute which defined the 
point at which the fetus would be protected in terms of the age of the 
fetus.75 Apparently, for such a statute to withstand constitutional at­
tack, it must precisely define the point at which the fetus becomes 
viable, a point that cannot be precisely defined, or it must base that 
point and, therefore, the decision whether or not to abort, on the 
physician's subjective determination.76 
The Supreme Court decisions since Roe clearly indicate that, 
although the state may regulate abortion after viability, before that 
point it may not provide the potentially viable fetus with any protec­
68. Id. at 182 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 140 n. 37). 
69. Id. at 193-98. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 600 (lOth ed. 1975). 
70. See Ely, supra note 63, at 920 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 118 n.2 and lJoe, 410 
U.S. at 181-82). 
71. A number of statutes which were designed to provide some measure of protec­
tion for the fetus have been struck down as unconstitutional: Colautti v. Franklin, 439 
U.S. 379, 397-401 (1979) (statute subjecting the physician to criminal liability if certain 
prescribed standards were not followed when the fetus might be viable); Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-79 (1976) (statute prohibiting the use of saline 
amniocentesis and requiring the consent of either the parents or the husband); Hodgson 
v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350, 1358 (8th Cir. 1976) (statute defining point of potential viabil­
ity at twenty weeks); Word v. Poeiker, 495 F.2d 1349, 1351-52 (8th Cir. 1974) (city ordi­
nance requiring that clinics be licensed and that they meet certain standards of 
cleanliness, training, and recordkeeping); Women's Medical Center v. Roberts, 530 
F.Supp. 1136, 1145-47 (D.R.1. 1982) (statute requiring a twenty-four hour waiting period 
and that woman be informed of certain facts about the fetus and abortion). For a discus­
sion of the difficulty in designing a criminal abortion statute today, see Note, Viability 
and Fetal Life in State Criminal Abortion Laws, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 324 
(1981). 
72. 439 U.S. at 390. 
73. G. GUNTHER, infra note 69, at 616. 
74. 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
75. Id. at 64. 
76. Colaul/i, 439 U.S. at 392-97. Apparently, if the aborting physician knew the 
fetus was viable, or was in some way culpable in not knowing, and still aborted it, then 
he could be convicted of criminal abortion, provided that the mother's life or health were 
not at stake. Id. 
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tion which the aborting physician has not chosen to extend.77 There­
fore, because the point of viability is difficult to determine, viable 
fetuses may be destroyed78 if the aborting physician makes a judg­
mental error. That such little protection for the potentially viable 
fetus exists presents a problem for those who believe a life capable of 
being preserved should be preserved. Under Roe, even a viable fetus 
does not, in its own right, command constitutional protection but 
must depend for its right to life on what the state may consider a 
compelling interest. Such an interest has not fared well when bal­
anced against the fundamental right of the mother.79 
The Roe decision has created another problem by interfering 
with the evolution toward more fetal protection in many branches of 
law. It is tolerable that the different branches of law may be at dif­
ferent evolutionary stages in the development of fetal rights,80 but 
each branch must be allowed to evolve at some finite rate, one that 
society can tolerate, and one that leads toward a more unified sys­
tem. The evolutionary process has been interrupted in a number of 
areas as a result of the way in which the Roe decision has been ap­
plied.8l This is particularly true in the area of abortion law; an ex­
amination of the cases in that area after Roe exposes the fiction of 
the state's ability to protect the potentially viable fetus.82 Even when 
the fetus is found to be viable, the mother's health may sufficiently 
outweigh the state's compelling interest in protecting it.83 It is likely 
that a state's compelling interest will seldom balance favorably 
77. 	 See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191-92 (1973); Co/aulli, 439 U.S. at 393­
94. 
78. E.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75-79 (1976) (the use of 
saline amniocentesis in the second trimester cannot be prohibited); Planned Parenthood 
Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 664 F.2d 687,690 (8th Cir. 1981), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2517, 2520 (1983) 
(hospitalization requirements for dilatation and evacuation-the only second trimester 
procedure used in Missouri-were held not reasonably related to the mother's health). 
In neither saline amniocentesis nor dilatation and evacuation is the life of the fetus pre­
served. See infra notes 177-78 and accompanying text. 
79. Even after viability, the mother's health may outweigh the state's compelling 
interest in protecting the viable fetus. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165. 
80.· For example, constitutional law utilizes the fiction of viability that tort law 
abandoned more than two decades ago. 	See supra notes 26 & 61 and accompanying text. 
8!. See supra notes 33-37, 44-46, & 70-76 and accompanying text. 
82. See supra note 71 (examples of protective provisions in a number of statutes 
that have been struck down). See also L. WARDLE & M.A.G. WOOD, A LAWYER LOOKS 
AT ABORTION 157-73 (1982) (citing additional cases in which such statutes have been 
invalidated). 
83. 410 U.S. at 165. It is unclear what the Supreme Court meant by "health," as it 
did not specify whether mental as well as physical health was included or to what degree 
the mother's health must be threatened. 
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against a woman's constitutional right.84 On its face, however, there 
is room for both growth and change in the Roe decision, as it dictates 
a balancing of a mother's liberty interest against the state's compel­
ling interest in protecting potential life at viability. If such a balanc­
ing test were in reality adopted, as the states express a greater interest 
in protecting the unborn, as they clearly have done,85 the scales 
should shift toward giving that interest greater weight. 
D. Potential Conflicts 
The law in the area of fetal rights has changed since and, in fact, 
was changing before the Roe decision. In all areas of law where fetal 
rights are protected, there is a potential conflict with a woman's right 
to choose to abort. Such conflict has been explicitly recognized in 
the following cases. 
In Chrisaafogeorgis v. Brandenberg,86 a viable fetus was killed in 
an automobile accident. The court allowed a wrongful death ac­
tion87 by defining "person" within the statute88 to include a viable 
fetus. 89 Dissenting, Justice Ryan argued that a fetus is not a "person" 
within the statute90 and expressed his concern regarding the poten­
tial conflict with the Roe decision by asking if the father would have 
a cause of action for wrongful death in an abortion case.9\ The dis­
sent expressed the belief that the legislature should correlate wrong­
ful death statutes with abortion statutes to avoid such a conflict.92 
84. Recently, the Supreme Court decided three abortion cases. Simopoulos v. Vir­
ginia, 103 S. Ct. 2532 (1983); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 
103 S. Ct. 2481 (1983); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983). In 
both the Akron and Planned Parenthood cases, the Court held, among other things, that 
the hospitalization requirement for all second trimester abortions was unconstitutional. 
Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2493; Planned Parenthood, 103 S. Ct. at 2520. Since during the 
second trimester the state's compelling interest is only in the mother's health and not in 
the preservation of the potential life of the fetus, Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65, safer modem 
procedures make hospitalization unnecessary to protect that interest, at least into the 
early part of the second trimester. Akron, 103 S. Ct. at 2495-96. With these decisions, the 
states have lost much of their ability to monitor abortions in which fetuses may be viable. 
Although such monitoring may not have protected viable fetuses so long as they were 
destroyed before there was any opportunity for evaluation, supra note 78 and accompa­
nying text, it may have been a deterrent to physicians contemplating the aborting of a 
potentially viable fetus. 
85. See supra notes 31-32 & 38 and accompanying text. 
86. 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973). 
87. Id at 374, 304 N.E.2d at 91. 
88. Illinois Wrongful Death Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, §§ I, 2 (1981). 
89. 55 Ill.2d at 374-75, 304 N.E.2d at 92. 
90. Id at 377-79, 304 N.E.2d at 93-94 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
91. Id at 379-81, 304 N.E.2d at 94-95. 
92. Id at 381, 304 N.E.2d at 95. 
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In Parks v. Harden ,93 the majority held that an unborn was an 
"eligible individual" for whom the mother could collect AFDC94 
benefits. The dissent noted that, under the majority's holding, a wo­
man might collect benefits the first six months of pregnancy and then 
abort the fetus before viability.95 The dissent argued that it was in­
consistent to extend benefits out of concern for the fetus's wellbeing 
and then allow the mother to abort her "eligible individual."96 Al­
though the majority decision was overruled in Burns v. Alcala,97 such 
an argument reflects the basic philosophical conflicts which may de­
velop in light of the Roe decision when there is an attempt to extend 
fetal protection. 
In Wallace v. Wallace ,98 a case in which a nonviable fetus was 
killed in a motor vehicle accident, the court held that "it would be 
incongruous for a mother to have a federal constitutional right to 
deliberately destroy a nonviable fetus. . . and at the same time for a 
third person to be subject to liability to the fetus for his unintended 
but merely negligent acts."99 The dissent expressed the belief that a 
fetus can be a "person" for one purpose and not for another.loo Such 
an analysis would lead to the same result as would application of a 
balancing test, 101 and the dissenting judge might have recognized 
this alternative approach had he carried his analysis further. 
In Curlender v. Rio-Science Laboratories, 102 a wrongful life ac­
tion103 was allowed when the parents were not given sufficient facts 
to make a conscious choice. I04 The court noted, in dicta, that if the 
parents were given such facts and made the wrong choice, then the 
child could sue them.105 If one can be held liable for making the 
93. 504 F.2d 861, 872 (5th Cir. 1974). 
94. Aid to Families with Dependent Children. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 601-612 (West 1974 & Supp. 1982). 
95. 504 F.2d at 877 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting). 
96. Id. 
97. 420 U.S. 575, 578 (1974). 
98. 120 N.H. 675, 421 A.2d 134 (1980). 
99. Id. at 679, 421 A.2d at 137. The court failed to recognize that the difficulty is 
not removed at the point of viability, as the mother may still have such a right if her life 
or health is endangered. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165. 
100. 120 N.H. 684, 421 A.2d at 140 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
101. In the former case, the mother's constitutionally protected right to abort a 
nonviable fetus would outweigh the fetus's right to protection; in the latter case there is 
no constitutional interest to counterbalance the same fetal right. 
102. 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Ct. App. 1980). 
103. A wrongful life action is one by the child rather than the parents, as in one for 
wrongful birth. Berman v. Allen, 80 N.J. 421, 423, 404 A.2d 8, 10 (1979). 
104. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488. 
105. Id. In response to this problem, the California legislature passed a bill 
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wrong choice and not aborting, then it logically follows that one may 
also be held liable for deciding to abort if that decision is later found 
to be the wrong one. The problematic ramifications of such a logical 
argument are clear. 
In the case of Grodin v. Grodin, 106 the court allowed an action to 
be brought against the mother for prenatal injuries suffered due to 
her negligence. 107 Although the court did not explicitly recognize a 
potential conflict, one may easily be perceived. In Danos v. St. 
Pierre,108 the court argued that it made no sense to allow the 
tortfeasor to escape punishment because the fetus was dead rather 
than injured. 109 If this argument is applied to a situation such as that 
in Grodin, then a mother could be held liable for the death of a fetus 
caused by her negligence. This is only a small, logical step away 
from holding her liable for the intentional killing of her unborn. I 10 
These five cases offer only a sampling of the numerous conflicts 
which have arisen or may arise as a consequence ofRoe. Such con­
flicts are the result of extending fetal protection on the one handIII 
and withdrawing it on the other.ll2 
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM 
A. Congressional Solutions 113 
Two types of federal legislation have been initiated and a 
number of bills have been introduced in response to Roe. One of 
preventing such an action. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (Deering 1983). Murphy, supra note 
17, at 364-65 n.31. 
106. 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1980). 
107. Id at 401-02,301 N.W.2d at 871. Intrafamily immunity, with two exceptions, 
has been abolished in Michigan. Id at 399,301 N.W.2d at 870. 
108. 402 So.2d 633 (La. 1981). 
109. Id at 638. 
110. See generally Comment, Parental Liability for Prenatal Injury, 14 COLUM. J.L. 
& Soc. PROBS. 47 (1978). The author of the foregoing comment points out that it would 
seem illogical to hold parents liable for negligently injuring their unborn but not for 
aborting it. Id at 83. 
Ill. See supra notes 17-43 and accompanying text. 
112. See supra notes 57-76 and accompanying text. 
1l3. See generally Committee on Federal Legislation, Anti-Abortion Proposals 
Before the 97th Congress, 37 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 559 (1982); Destro, Abortion and the 
Constitution: The Needfor a Life-Protective Amendment, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 1250 (1975); 
Estreicher, Congressional Power and Constitutional Rights: Rejlections on Proposed 
"Human Life" Legislation, 68 VA. L. REV. 333 (1982); Kolb, The Proposed Human Life 
Statute: Abortion as Murder?, 67 A.B.A.J. 1122 (1981); M. ROSENBERG & K.J. LEWIS, 
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO ENACT A HUMAN LIFE STATUTE: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS OF S. 158 (1981). 
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these, the Helms-Hyde bill,114 declares that human life shall exist 
from the moment of conception and that "person" includes all 
human life. Stephen H. Galebach, the originator of the bill, argues 
that, since the Roe Court declined to define when life begins, it is up 
to the legislature to do SO.115 He further argued that the Court's 
holding that "person" does not include the unborn rests on its inabil­
ity to define the beginning of human life. I 16 The effect of such legis­
lation would be to give the fetus greater protection by extending to it 
a constitutional interest of its own from the moment of conception; 
this, in tum, would require a genuine balancing against the constitu­
tional interest of the mother from that moment. 
Some proponents of the right-to-life movement questioned the 
constitutionality of such bills and decided that a constitutional 
amendment would be more effective. 117 Two types of amendments 
have been drafted: the first prohibits all abortions I 18 and the second 
allows abortion only to save the life of the mother. I 19 The effect of 
either of these would be to extinguish a woman's constitutionally 
protected liberty interest and establish an extremely rigid system. 120 
Court decisions and legislation that are rule-oriented are often 
rigid 121 and not susceptible to a smoother, albeit slower, evolution 
which would allow for society's changing needs. 122 In fact, it may be 
the rule-oriented nature of Roe 123 which makes that decision so 
inflexible. 
114. S. 158, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § l(a)(b), 127 CONGo REC. 58420 (1981). This bill 
is also known as the "Human Life Statute." G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 114 
(10th ed. Supp. 1981). 
115. G. GUNTHER, supra note 114, at 115. 
116. ld 
117. ld at 48. 
118. E.g., S.l. Res. 19, H.R.l. Res. 104, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (partially re­
printed in G. GUNTHER, supra note 114, at 48). 
119. E.g., S.l. Res. 17, H.R.l. Res. 125, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (partially re­
printed in G. GUNTHER, supra note 114, at 48). 
120. Although some amendments are written broadly and are subject to judicial 
interpretation, one which defines "person" to include "unborn offspring at every stage of 
their biological development," G. GUNTHER, supra note 114, at 48 (citing S.l. Res. 17, 
H.R.l. Res. 125, § 1), and which requires that "(n)o unborn person shall be deprived of 
life by any person ... (except when) required to prevent the death of the mother," id 
(citing § 2), cannot be interpreted to allow survival of the mother's right to an abortion 
except when her death is imminent. 
121. For a discussion of the rigidity problem in the area of wrongful death actions, 
see Note, Wrongful Death and The Stillborn Fetus: A Common Law Solution to a Statu­
tory Dilemma, 43 U. Pirr. L. REV. 819, 830-34 (1982). 
122. For an example of such an evolution in tort law, see supra notes 17-42 and 
accompanying text. 
123. See supra note 64. 
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B. The States' Solution 
Some states have managed to extend protection to the fetus 
through their own "solution." By refusing public aid for abortions 
to indigent women, these states force women who have insufficient 
funds and who are unable to secure aid elsewhere, to bear unwanted 
children they cannot afford to raise. 124 Such a denial of aid has been 
held constitutional by the Supreme Court in Beal v. Doe, 125 Maher v. 
Roe,126 and Poelker v. Doe .127 This "solution" is most disturbing in 
that it defeats one of the important justifications for the Roe Court's 
nationalization of a woman's right to abort-that of extending the 
right equally to all, including those who could not afford to travel to 
a state in which abortion was legal. Further, this solution does not 
provide equal protection for all unborn at any particular point in 
their development-it only protects the unborn of the poor. 128 
C. A Possible Alternative-The Douglas Case 
Neither leaving the situation as it is, with both the real and po­
tential problems resulting from the Roe decision, nor adopting legis­
lation to move rigidly and abruptly in the other direction provides a 
very satisfactory answer. The problems of unwanted pregnancies 
pointed out in Roe 129 still plague society. Science is attempting to 
help solve such problems; in the future, early transplantation of a 
fetus into a barren womb or a test tube may be possible, and better 
methods of birth control may be available. Further, society may be­
come more tolerant of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and a woman's 
surrender of her child for adoption, but the problems as they exist 
today cannot be ignored. At present, it is absolutely necessary to 
allow women, rich and poor, to exercise their constitutional right to 
abortion before viability. On the other hand, it is also necessary to 
provide greater protection to the potentially viable fetus. None of 
the solutions offered by lawmakers accomplishes these goals; 130 
Judge Clarie's holding in the Douglas case may do so. 
The facts of Douglas are as follows: On July 8, 1981, Rosalie 
124. See Jones, Abortion and the Consideration ofFundamental, Irreconcilable In­
terests, 33 SYRACUSE L. REv. 565, 571 (1982). 
125. 432 U.S. 438, 447-48 n. 15 (1977). 
126. 432 U.S. 464, 469-70 (1977). 
127. 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977). 
128. See Jones, supra note 124, at 571 n.38 (citing Cates, The Hyde Amendment in 
Action, 246 J. A.M.A. 1\09-11 (1981». 
129. 4\0 U.S. at 153. 
130. See supra text accompanying notes 113-28. 
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Douglas, then approximately six months pregnant, was allegedly hit 
on the head with a nightstick by a Hartford police officer while she 
was attempting to aid her sister. 131 Paul, Ms. Douglas' son, was born 
on October 22, 1981, apparently with prenatal injuries caused by the 
officer's blow.132 Both the mother and the infant alleged violation of 
their constitutional rights because of police brutality and claimed ac­
tual and punitive damages under section 1983 against the unnamed 
police officers and the town of Hartford. 133 On July 2, 1982, the de­
fendants moved to dismiss the charges on several grounds. 134 The 
court, however, disagreed with the defendants' argument that the fe­
tus is neither a "citizen" nor a "person" within the meaning of the 
fourteenth amendment. 135 Instead, the court denied the motion and 
held that a viable fetus is a "person" and thus has standing to sue 
under section 1983.136 Judge elarie's opinion restated the plaintiffs' 
arguments, emphasizing the expansion of fetal rights in a wide vari­
ety of legal contexts,137 but made no mention of the Roe decision, in 
spite of the fact that the defendant's main argument was based on 
Roe .138 
This case cannot be distinguished from Roe based solely on the 
fact that the action was brought under section 1983. Section 1983 
was a codi.fication of a portion of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, 
enacted to enforce the fourteenth amendment. 139 The Act is reme­
dial onlyl40 and may be invoked either when constitutional rights 
131. Memorandum of Law as to Claims of Paul Douglas at 1. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. 542 F. Supp. at 1268. 
135. Id. at 1269-70. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 1270. The plaintiffs had cited a number of cases supporting the propo­
sition that the recent trend in the state courts is toward expansion of fetal rights. Memo­
randum of Law as to Claims of Paul Douglas at 2-3 (citing Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 
564, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 565 P.2d 122 (1977); Simon v. Mullin, 34 Conn. Supp. 139, 380 
A.2d 1353 (1977); and Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 
(1973». 
138. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant at 2. 
139. 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2609-10. A right of action was created 
in federal court against state and territorial officials who refused to enforce states laws 
against those who violated the rights of freed slaves and union sympathizers. Supreme 
Court decisions have extended § 1983 protection so that governments and their officers 
may be liable if they violate the civil rights of persons within their jurisdiction. Id. 
140. A statute which is remedial only gives a means of obtaining redress and does 
not furnish the right. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1162-63 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). E.g., 
Maher v. Gagne,'448 U.S. 122, 129 n.ll (1980); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights 
Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979); Davis v. Foreman, 251 F.2d 421, 422 (7th Cir. 1958); 
Hernandez V. Pierce, 512 F. Supp. 1154, 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Harley v.Schuylkill, 476 
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have been violated141 or when there has been some deprivation of 
rights under federal law. 142 
Under section 1983, only the person injured has standing to 
sue. 143 The definition of "person" for purposes of section 1983 must 
be found within the substantive law being enforced. 144 Therefore, in 
cases such as Doug/as, in which deprivation of constitutional rights is 
alleged, the meaning of "person" must be found within the Constitu­
tion, or, more precisely, within the fourteenth amendment. 14S Courts 
employing this approach have held, based on Roe, that a fetus is not 
a "person." 146 Further, one court noted that since Roe, no case has 
held that a fetus is a "person" within the Constitution. 147 Although 
there are very few section 1983 cases involving fetal rights, courts, in 
other contexts, have consistently sought the meaning of "person" for 
purposes of section 1983 within the Constitution. 148 
In light of the remedial nature of section 1983 and the explicit 
holding in Roe that" 'person' ... does not include the unbom,"149 
it is difficult to see how Judge Clarie could arrive at his holding in 
F. Supp. 191, 194 (E.D. Pa. 1979). See also Scott v. City of Anniston, 430 F. Supp. 508, 
515 (N.D. Ala. 1977), aJTd in part, rev'd in part, 597 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
446 U.S. 917 (1980) (argument that "a statute can be no broader than its [c]onstitutional 
base"-referring to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act rather than to § 1983). 
141. E.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146-47 (1979); Firnhaber v. Sensen­
brenner, 385 F. Supp. 406, 409 (E.D. Wis. 1974). 
142. E.g., Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 829-30 (1966); Gage v. Common­
wealth Edison Co., 356 F. Supp. 80, 87 (N.D. lli. 1972). 
143. Jones v. Hildebrant, 191 Colo. 1,8-9,550 P.2d 339,345, cert. granted, 429 U.S. 
1061, dismissed, 432 U.S. 183 (1976). There have been arguments made that, where par­
ents allege a financialloss, this traditional rule should be relaxed, e.g., Clark v. Lutcher, 
436 F. Supp. 1266,1269 (M.D. Pa. 1977); but in Bums v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975), the 
Court held that the unborn do not have a right to sue for AFDC (Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children) benefits under § 1983. Id at 577. 
144. Harman v. Daniels, 525 F. Supp. 798, 799-800 (W.D. Va. 1981); McGarvey v. 
McGee Womens Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 751, 753 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aJTd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d 
Cir. 1973). 
145. See mpra notes 139-44 and accompanying text. 
146. Harman v. Daniels, 525 F. Supp. 798, 800 (W.D. Va. 1981); McGarvey v. 
McGee Womens Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 751, 754 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aJTd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d 
Cir. 1973). 
147. Harman v. Daniels, 525 F. Supp. 798, 800 (W.D. Va. 1981). Harman was 
relied on heavily by the defense in Douglas, as it was both factually and legally on point. 
The Harman court found that a fetus did not have an action under § 1983 because § 1983 
protection extended no further than that given by the fourteenth amendment. Id at 799­
800. 
148. E.g., Adams v. Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585, 587 (7th Cir. 1961); Trapper Brown 
Construction v. Electromech, 358 F. Supp. 105, 106-07 (D.N.H. 1973); Tobin v. Rizzo, 
305 F. Supp. 1135, 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1969). 
149. 410 U.S. at 158. 
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Douglas without intentionally flouting the Supreme Court. The 
judge may have reached such a holding based on several lines of 
reasoning. It is hard to believe he thought that the two actions could 
be distinguished based on the difference between a section 1983 case 
and one under the fourteenth amendment. It is more likely he. rec­
ognized that justice requires there be a remedy for such an injury, 
and that, since, in this case, there was no constitutional interest to 
counterbalance the interest of the plaintiff as there was in Roe, the 
remedy should be applied. 
On the other hand, Judge Clarie's analysis may have been far 
more complex. On examination of his dissent inAbele v. Markle,lso 
it is clear he believed that Connecticut had a strong interest in pre­
serving the life of the unborn and that action such as was taken in 
Roe should be left to the legislature. l5l Now almost ten years after 
Roe, the judge may believe that 1) the Roe Court's argument that 
fetal rights are not well-recognizedlS2 may be less valid today and 
2) the holding that the fetus is not a "person" within the fourteenth 
amendment has created a dichotomy in the legal rights of the fetus 
which is leading to intolerable conflicts in our laws. Support for 
such a conclusion is found in the previous analysis of fetal rights 
evolution and of the conflicts resulting from the Roe decision. ls3 
Judge Clarie held that a viable fetus is a "person."IS4 Such a 
definition would extend the same protection after viability as would 
be provided from the point of conception by adoption of the 
"Human Life Statute."lss It would allow a balancing similar to that 
promised by the Roe Court, but, in fact, seldom done in a manner 
favorable to the potentially viable fetus. ls6 Such a step, requiring one 
constitutional interest to be weighed against another,ls7 would possi­
150. 351 F. Supp. at 224, 233-36 (D. Conn. 1972) (Clarie, J., dissenting). While 
Roe was pending the court, inAhe/e, struck down Connecticut's abortion statute in much 
the same manner that the Roe Court struck down Texas' statute. 351 F.Supp. 224, 232 
(D. Conn. 1972). 
151. 351 F. Supp. 224, 235 (D. Conn. 1972) (Clarie, J., dissenting). 
152. 410 U.S. at 161-62. 
153. See supra notes 26,31,32,38, 86-112 and accompanying text. 
154. Doug/as, 542 F. Supp. at 1269. 
155. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
156. See supra note 71. 
157. The Roe Court argued that, if the fetus were a "person," then the mother 
would have no right to abort, 410 U.S. at 156-57; but this reasoning is fallacious in that, if 
two constitutional rights are in conflict, they must be balanced. Ely, supra note 63, at 926 
n.48. q: Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (a case in which the 
first amendment rights of the press were balanced against the sixth amendment right to a 
fair trial). 
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bly allow consideration at the point of viability of such factors as the 
father's wishes, the burden on the mother, and the availability of a 
home for the child. Further, with a weightier interest potentially in 
the balance, and as the point at which that interest may become op­
erative, safeguards to protect that interest from being ignored would 
likely be allowed. ISS If states were allowed to establish a period of 
potential viability, based on the fetus's age, in which such a balanc­
ing would be required, the burden placed upon the physician would 
be lessened. 159 Such a period could be extended back to the earliest 
point at which the fetus could survive outside the womb to provide 
some protection to all viable fetuses. l60 
If appealed, it seems likely that Judge Clarie's holding will be 
reversed, as it is difficult not to conclude that his decision conflicts 
with that of the Supreme Court. 161 This may be unfortunate because 
such a holding might provide the preferred small evolutionary step. 
There are several arguments, however, that might allow this decision 
to stand. First, the premise that" 'person' . . . does not include the 
unborn" 162 was unnecessary for the Court's decision in Roe .163 Sec­
ond, the Court's definition of "person" is only relevant in a context 
where the beginning of life is unknown but is not relevant to the 
point at which life is known to exist. l64 Finally, since the Roe case 
involved a Texas statute and Texas, according to the Court,165 had 
shown little interest in protecting the fetus, in that situation " 'person' 
. . . does not include the unborn"; 166 on the other hand, since Con­
necticut has always expressed great interest in the preservation of 
life, it may appropriately define a viable fetus as a "person" within 
158. Under the Roe decision, during the second trimester, the state's only compel­
ling interest is in that of the mother's health. 410 U.S. at 164-65. For that reason, tech­
niques which may destroy the fetus are allowed if they are the safest for the mother. 
Co/aul/i, 439 U.S. at 397-98 (saline amniocentesis); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ash­
croft, 664 F.2d 687, 689 (8th Cir. 1981), affd, 103 S. Ct. 2517 (1983) (dilatation and 
evacuation). 
159. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
160. Such a suggestion is similar to that made by King, supra note 17, that the law 
"should err on the safe side ... to give all [fetuses) that may be viable a chance." Id. at 
1680 n.I46. 
161. See supra text accompanying notes 139-49. 
162. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158. 
163. See supra note 157. If the Roe Court erred and a balancing test would be 
done whether or not the fetus was a "person," then the holding that the fetus is not a 
"person" was unnecessary to reach the Court's decision. 
164. This argument is similar to that of Galebach, G. GUNTHER, supra note 114, at 
115. 
165. Roe, 410 U.S. at ISO-52. 
166. Id. at 158. 
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the fourteenth amendment. 167 
A simple answer to the mystery of Judge Clarie's decision 
would be to attribute it to his own resistance to liberalized abor­
tions,168 but there may be more behind it. 169 The fact that he did not 
refer to Roe is, admittedly, disturbing; but it may have been strategi­
cally wise if, in fact, this small evolutionary step is to be allowed to 
stand. Whether the judge's "solution" is a conscious one is a ques­
tion only the judge can answer. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The conflict that exists between the protection of a woman's 
constitutional right to privacy and the rights of the unborn cannot be 
completely resolved today. 170 The "solutions" offered by federal and 
state lawmakers are unacceptable and would create more problems 
than they would solve. l7l Rather than extending protection to the 
unborn at the point of conception, as these "solutions" would do, 172 
the Douglas definition of "person" extends protection only to a via­
ble fetus and allows the mother's right to abortion to remain intact, 
at least to the point at which the fetus may be viable. 173 At that 
point, since there potentially is a second constitutional interest, that 
of the fetus, a true balancing of that interest against the mother's 
would be necessary.174 
Admittedly many of the potential conflicts in areas of law in 
which fetal rights' evolution has been "aborted" would remain un­
resolved, even if Judge Clarie's definition of "person" is accepted. 
Such a definition; however, would at least allow extension of fetal 
rights to the point of potential viability.175 
The Douglas holding provides, at most, one small step down the 
evolutionary path. The future will require more steps, but, hope­
fully, not until the time when both the constitutional rights of the 
mother and that of the fetus may be protected equally and simulta­
neously. Science and society must work together to provide the final 
167. See Abele, 351 F. Supp. at 233-36 (Clarie, J., dissenting). See also 542 F. 
Supp. at 1270. 
168. Abele, 351 F. Supp. at 233-36 (Clarie, J., dissenting). 
169. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text. 
170. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. 
171. See supra notes 113-28 and accompanying text. 
172. Id. 
173. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text. 
174. Id. 
175. Some courts since Roe have refused to extend protection to the fetus at any 
stage. See supra notes 34 & 48 and accompanying text. 
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solution. 176 For now, one small step may prove sufficient to quiet 
the anger of those concerned that viable fetuses may be killed in 
utero 177 or removed in sections178 and yet would allow a mother's 
constitutional right to privacy to remain intact until the point of po­
tential viability and to be balanced equally against the fetus's right to 
life as a "person" after that point. 
Nancy Jo Linck 
176. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. 
177. The result of the abortion procedure using saline amniocentesis. Colaulli,439 
U.S. at 397-98. 
178. The result of dilatation and evacuation. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ash­
croft, 655 F.2d 848, 865 (8th Cir. 1981), (citing TIETZE, INDUCED ABORTION: 1979,68 
(3d ed. 1979», affd, \03 S. Ct. 2517 (1983). 
